Imperial Intelligence in the Middle East

Martin Thomas is a British expert on Colonial History. He is a professor of the University of Exeter, the author of The French Empire at War (1998), The French North African Crisis (2000), and The French Empire between the Wars. Imperialism, Politics, and Society (2005).

Thomas’ interests centre on the relationships between state intelligence gathering, police power and the maintenance of imperial rule. Dr. Thomas is especially interested in the policing of colonial dissent and the politics of colonial repression. One of the results of this work is a book Empires of Intelligence. Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914”, published by the University of California Press in 2007.

He's discussing with Andrei Soldatov how Great Britain and France, the largest imperial powers of the early twentieth century, coped with mounting anticolonial nationalism in the Arab world.

- First name that came to mind discussing this subject is inevitably Lawrence of Arabia. What is your opinion of this person?

- Lawrence was a capable intelligence analyst but it remains difficult to separate the 'legend' surrounding him from the actual extent of his influence. His greatest contribution was probably in helping to sustain the Arab Revolt, but it would be wrong to exaggerate his personal role here. More damaging was that the stereotypical views of Arab society, Muslim practice and pan-Arabism to which he subscribed helped perpetuate a narrow and imperialistic approach to British dealings with Arab nationalist groups after WWI.

- How can you explain that the same Lawrence, who was positioned himself as defender of Arab rights, later has agreed to be adviser of Churchill in Iraq? As result he was mastermind of gas attacks against insurgents?

- Lawrence was rarely a defender of Arab rights when they came into conflict with British imperial objectives. His influence on British policy in Iraq was also relatively slight by the time of the major uprisings in 1919-20.

- As far as we know from Lawrence’s book and other sources, by WWI UK intelligence preferred to recruit officers in University circles, especially who was studied Middle East (even Egyptologists). French services used other methods. What was the reason, what do you think?

- I think that the fundamental differences between British and French recruitment of Arabist specialists turn on three factors: a. cultural difference (the British tended to value classical education and fieldwork experience over professional training in a dedicated colonial training academy akin to the French Ecole Coloniale); b. French colonial administration always drew more heavily on military appointees, especially those with experience in French North African territories; c. French administration placed greater emphasis on long-service placements and anthropological training than did the British.

- It seems France wanted to control Lebanon and Syria in 1920-1945 more for ideology reasons, despite British, who wanted to control Palestine more for pragmatic reasons. At least we remember the words of general Gouraud, who told the tomb in Damascus: "Saladin, we have returned" (meaning Crusaders). What's the reason in your opinion?

- I see less of a dichotomy between France and Britain here. Both were eager to control Middle Eastern territory for reasons of political economy, strategic interest and wider imperial supremacy. Certainly, French administrators thought that Lebanon was a territory apart owing to its large Christian population and the long-standing influence of French commercial interests, Catholic missions and other educational institutions. But I still see issues of economics and strategy as more significant, even for the lobby groups that pushed hardest for French expansion in the region.

- It seems British secret services were more prepared to deal with the problem of Islamism than French. Lawrence was able to use Algerian Islamists, despite French officials. What was the reason? Is it the problem of French intelligence's internal culture?

- I'm not sure that I agree with you here. Both the British and French were reluctant to deal with groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and French security services were, if anything, more confident than their British counterparts that they maintained more widespread networks of influence among Islamic scholars. The British were sometimes fearful of the influence of pan-Islamism in British India, although such fears diminished as the Caliphate movement lost ground in the mid-1920s.

- What do you think why French intelligence always only followed British intelligence in Middle East adventures, but never on the contrary?

- I don't agree here either. I don't regard the British as much more successful than the French - the inter-war period is punctuated by more or less constant political violence in British and French imperial territories across the Arab world.

- Unfortunately we have not your book in Russian, so could you formulate here what the main difference between French and British approaches to intelligence in the Middle East?

- Less of a difference than might be imagined: each relied on information collection to compensate for the underlying weaknesses of the colonial state and the increasingly well-organised forms of political opposition to European rule. In this sense, intelligence gathering became increasingly integral to colonial coercion.

- Two chapters in your books devoted to revolts in British and French colonies and the answers of Empires. What the main difference between French and British approaches to counter insurgence?

- Any differences between them are outweighed by their similarities: the success or, more usually, the partial failure of colonial counter-insurgency depended on the quality and diversity of intelligence received and the ability to predict unrest before it escalated. Neither imperial power was able to end violent opposition to their presence which was intrinsic to the colonial condition: the task they faced was to contain it.

- What do you think, what’s the main lesson Imperial presence might be, especially for US, noting its presence in Iraq?

- The key 'lesson', if there is one, is that foreign occupation engenders implacable resistance and information collection has to begin from recognition of this rather than assuming that strategies of divide and rule, of identifying willing local auxiliairies, or of favouring one community over another can ultimately make the silent majority accept the foreign presence.