By Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

The anti-Kremlin opposition-in-exile has faced many challenges since Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine. They include feelings of deprivation, an urgent need to find a new agenda to address the war, the killing of its charismatic leader Alexey Navalny in a penal colony north of the Arctic Circle, and violent attacks on its members directed from Moscow.

Still, the opposition survived and found new ways to operate by supporting an independent-minded part of the Russian population, providing them with information about what is really going on in Russia, at war and in the world, and organizing the activities of a diaspora in the multiple millions, both politically but also culturally.

And yet, the Russian opposition has faced a barrage of criticism; they are, it is said, a loose and uncoordinated collection of disparate groups, acting on their own, and unable to unite behind a common cause.

This is partly true. Two and a half years after the full-scale invasion, the Russian opposition is split.

The Anti-Corruption Foundation of Alexei Navalny remains the most important; there is a constellation of media outlets and civic organizations funded and supported by the former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky; then there is the Free Russia Forum of former world chess champion Garry Kasparov, which organizes gatherings of the opposition in Vilnius; and the Free Russia Foundation, launched by Russian emigres in Washington in 2014, which has branches in several countries (Free Russia Houses) and a lobbying effort in the US capital city.

There are also several organizations launched after February 2022: the Civic Council of Ilya Ponomarev, a former Duma member who promotes and supports armed opposition to the Kremlin regime; the Feminist Anti-War Resistance, a coalition with activists abroad and in Russia; the Russian Democratic Club, a collection of anti-war democratic forces, launched by opposition politicians Gennady Gudkov and Dmitry Gudkov; and a variety of groups promoting the independence of some Russian regions in the post-Putin state.

Not all of those groups and fractions are keen to sit together at the same table.

But why should they?

The Russian opposition couldn’t form a government-in-exile for the simple reason that Putin didn’t invade Russia and remove the legitimate government, as Hitler and Stalin did with the Polish wartime government which found refuge in London.

What is more, no opposition leader had ever been allowed by Putin to take part in presidential elections in the country. The Belarusian dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenka made a mistake by letting Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the wife of an imprisoned opposition leader, take part in the election. Putin would never make that error, but that’s hardly the opposition’s fault.

There are several former members of the Russian Duma now in exile, like Ilya Ponomarev or Dmitry and Gennady Gudkov, but it’s hardly enough to form any opposition body that would be recognized as legitimate.

For Western governments, it would be probably more convenient to have one leader and one organization to talk to about post-Putin Russia, but they need to accept that this option has never been viable and stop blaming the opposition for the lack of it.

Many argue that coordination and unity would also benefit the opposition itself.

The argument goes that it would strengthen the democratic message to the Russian people, and a single, unified grouping could begin to work on plans for post-Putin Russia.

There are several problems with this argument.

We wrote in 2022 that the Russian opposition was using media activity as the most sensible approach given a climate of harsh repression and zero tolerance for all opposition political activity of any type.

There was a Coordination Council of the opposition in Russia in 2012-2013 when there was still some space for political action. But since then, most Council members have been exiled, imprisoned, or murdered, like Boris Nemtsov and Navalny.

YouTube and social media have become the tools by which the opposition gets their message to Russians. There are now over 70 Russian media groups in exile, with an audience of several million inside the country.

Journalists and the political opposition have worked together for years, so when, say, Navalny’s team has a new investigation out, it’s immediately picked up and discussed on all platforms.

Given such effective practical cooperation, why the need for some coordination body? As they say, if it ain’t broke don’t fix it.

As for media outlets, the argument is even clearer. Just as in Western countries, the proliferation of outlets is a sign of good health. The more media the merrier — each has its audience, both in the country and in the diaspora.

What about the argument that the opposition should be sitting down to work together on plans for the post-Putin, democratic Russian state?

This work is already underway, without any coordination. One project works on a new Russian constitution, with results published this year by a group of experts including Gregory Yudin, Evgeny Roshchin, and Artemy Magun. Once published, it immediately became part of the conversation among liberal-minded Russians in the country and beyond.

Then there is a documentary project from Navalny’s team about the lessons of the 1990s, the only time when there was some small chance to build a democratic Russia, and it was also widely discussed.

And there is the Reform project, launched in 2020 by the Free Russia Foundation as a platform to discuss future reforms of key institutions of Russian society, as well as other ideas.

At this stage, there is simply no need for disparate groups to have an approved common policy, since almost by definition they have different views on Russia’s present, future, and often even its past.

They should be left to work on their own political programs and approaches. They can then join the current, vibrant debate and share their ideas in the common space. Ideas should be tested through competition, not stifled by a common leadership in the name of unity.

Those of us in exile and in opposition are perhaps understandably suspicious of calls to bow down before a great leader. The old TV pictures of aging, seemingly stupefied Politburo members listening to the supreme leader are deeply imprinted in the Russian memory.

In the meantime, there are opposition leaders in Russia, in jail, living in very harsh conditions, like Ilya Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza. They are still capable of getting their message out.

They are doing the bravest and hardest work. And to achieve what they achieve daily, by demonstrating their resistance and — as Václav Havel said — by living in truth, does not require a coordinating body in some faraway city.

Published in CEPA

Agentura.ru 2024