The most striking feature of the past four years for Russia’s security and intelligence agencies is that they have emerged largely intact, in terms of both leadership and structure.  

State security agencies are amplifying warnings to enemies of the state using compliant pro-Kremlin journalists. Having realized that the Kremlin couldn’t control these young people by the usual means, the FSB has returned to tried and trusted methods, including intimidation and harassment. 

In mid-January, Ekaterina Pronicheva, the 48-year-old daughter of a prominent FSB general, was appointed the new director of the Pushkin Museum. The same day, her younger sister Elena, 42 years old, resigned as a director of the Tretyakov Gallery.

How the Shadow Fleet Enables Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in Europe.

The spy agency has drafted legislation that would allow FSB officers to take part in the work of juvenile commissions across the country and to feed intelligence on so-called “troubled youth” into government blacklists and databases.  

Putin’s intelligence services are being cleansed of non-Russians, a policy completely at odds with the agencies’ multiethnic histories. It is a risky move that may one day bring serious consequences to the regime.

An excerpt from Our Dear Friends in Moscow, the new book on the fate of a group of Russian friends.

While the Russian army measures its successes in Ukraine in meters of captured territory, inside the country the FSB is quietly but methodically building a base for a new GULAG.

A new book by the exiled Russian journalists Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov tells the story of lost friendships and a broken generation.

A profound anxiety about the espionage capabilities of the UK and France is rooted deep in the Kremlin’s consciousness.

Vladimir Putin’s warming relationship with Donald Trump has given Moscow the chance to bring more people back from US prisons. Russia’s first choice was instructive.

The Erdoğan government gives extraordinary freedoms to Putin’s spooks and influence peddlers.

In Beslan, the Russian security services and elite forces seemed to be parts of a broken watch: They were all in one place, all involved in the same movement, but the whole mechanism was out of order. The extract from our book The New Nobility, based on our September 2004 reporting from Beslan.

Yet another bloody terrorist attack has exposed the truth behind Putin’s promises of domestic security — he can’t deliver.

There is a very significant gap between the public image of Russia’s new defense minister Andrei Belousov and the reality.

On Moscow’s Ruthless Campaign Against Russians Who Fight for Ukraine: our article in Foreign Affairs.

Taken together, the arrests of at least four senior officers amount to the most serious attack on the Russian military in close to 25 years of Putin’s rule.

As Putin starts his fifth term as Russian president, he has appealing offers for security services on the dark side.

Putin’s regime is now openly purchasing influence in neighboring countries.

The dead and injured from the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack are the primary victims, but Putin and his spies are running from a reckoning with reality.

Inside the minds of Russia’s guard dogs, the regime’s enemies are busy and innumerable. A lot of people are getting bitten as a result.

In the midwinter of Russia’s full-scale war on its western neighbor, the regime looks unassailable. But hope survives.

Navalny’s sudden death carries all the hallmarks of the Putin regime. The Kremlin won’t take responsibility because it doesn’t need to.

The Russian regime is determined to instill fear into the population. So while the targets may appear random, the aim is clear.

How the Ukraine War Has Changed the Game for the Kremlin’s Intelligence Operatives—and Their Western Rivals. Our article in Foreign Affairs.

The Russian secret services are built on a profound distrust of the common people.

Two years it felt risky to report on Russian oligarchs. Now it seems the aim is to attack Western publishers and media to make them think twice before accepting Russian journalists’ reporting.

The Kremlin’s reliance on migrants is creating significant strains. At some point, these are likely to result in serious consequences.

Russia’s army has a complicated view of the Israeli military.

The Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin’s HiddenInfluence Campaign in the West.

The Russian capital’s glitzy office district is Ukraine’s latest target. What is Kyiv’s targeting strategy?

A good tactician, Vladimir Putin is trying to turn a difficult situation to his advantage. It is not an easy task. 

Russia’s army is in some disarray, but it is not poised for collapse.

The mercenary uprising has revealed much about the weaknesses of Putin’s Russia, some of which may prove fatal.

Any hope that a Putin antidote might be found among Russia’s regional governing classes is falling away.

It was meant to be a swift military victory. Several days after Russian tanks rolled onto Ukrainian territory, the Federal Security Service (FSB) was to help impose a new pro-Kremlin puppet government in Kyiv. Nevertheless, forecasts by Putin’s spies soon proved to be overly optimistic.

The war not only compromised Russia’s army and history. It also destroyed hopes for Russia’s future. For years Kremlin propaganda had said the technology would fix the country’s corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy. The authorities invested heavily in the digitalization of the economy and state management (not least a state-of-the-art surveillance state.)

The mood among Russia’s special forces and the FSB began to change dramatically in the fall, when Russian troops abandoned Kherson, suffering the latest of many humiliations for the Russian army. Suddenly, the social media channels we use to communicate with our contacts began to change, as images of religious icons flooded in, along with prayers for the victory of the Russian army and calls to pray for soldiers on the battlefield. 

Since Putin’s plan to win a short military war in Ukraine has visibly failed, Russia is getting  ready to wage a long and devastating war in Ukraine. To do so, it must adjust the economy to the new conditions and increase weapons production.

In the Kremlin food chain, assassins are more valuable than spies, while both are expected to persecute émigrés.

Generations of Russians schooled during and after the Soviet Union were taught that Russia’s imperial expansion took place peacefully. In this version of history, Russia was always reacting to western aggression. Sound familiar?

Below is the foreword to the recently released paperback edition.

When Russia’s government machine cannot deliver, Vladimir Putin is increasingly reliant on a tried and trusted fixer to do the job.

The Kremlin is building its network of domestic surveillance technology and quietly mobilizing the public administration to deal with “troublemakers” at home.

The bloody assault helped shape Putin’s regime and the public response to difficult truths.

Russia’s ruler is using increasingly ruthless tactics to keep possible opponents off-balance, including senior members of the elite.

The Kremlin has done everything possible to seal off Russian citizens from independent news media, and it’s failing.

Russian troops are using social media channels to discuss the war, despite potentially punitive punishments. The Kremlin won’t like it.

Vladimir Putin has removed Russia’s biggest intelligence agency, the FSB, from its role as the primary spy agency for the war in Ukraine and handed responsibility to the GRU.

The security institutions, the ‘siloviki’, that are key to propping up the regime are exchanging recriminations for a growing list of failures in the war on Ukraine.

The Kremlin pretends that strong personal relationships are a mark of Russia’s president. That’s not really true.

Faced with the brutal economic consequences of its war of choice, the Kremlin is falling back on old-style communist-era policies.

Russia has decided to re-make the global order to its own liking.

Who does Vladimir Putin listen to, and why? The answer shines a light on the Russian decision-making machine, especially on sensitive topics like Ukraine and NATO.

Authoritarian Olympics, like the Beijing Winter games starting on February 4, are an exercise in feel-good nationalism. Until the final payment demand arrives.

Russia and Ukraine are in the midst of a bloody physical and intellectual divorce; liberal intellectuals are the despondent victims.

A cabal of KGB operatives stationed in Arab countries and Israel took over Russian foreign intelligence at the end of the Cold War. Their impact is still felt.